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Moneyball for State Regulators 
 
Edward Glaeser* and Cass R. Sunstein** 
 
Abstract 
 
For over thirty years, Republican and Democratic presidents have required 
executive agencies to assess the costs and benefits of significant regulations, and 
to proceed only if the benefits justify the costs (to the extent permitted by law). 
The goals of the resulting processes have been to constrain unjustified regulation, 
to promote interagency coordination, and to allow a degree of centralized 
management of what can be a cumbersome bureaucratic apparatus. 
Unfortunately, state and local governments sometimes impose costly 
requirements, undisciplined by careful analysis of their likely consequences. New 
institutions at the state level, producing such analysis, could be highly beneficial, 
replacing processes sometimes driven by anecdotes, dogmas, emotions, and 
interest-group pressures with a form of Regulatory Moneyball. 
 
I. The Basic Proposal 
 
Should state and local governments ask whether the benefits of regulations exceed 
their costs? Sensible regulatory requirements can reduce illnesses and accidents, protect 
the environment, and maintain quality of life. But when regulation is onerous and poorly 
designed, it can cause serious harm -- overwhelming small businesses, reducing 
economic growth, eliminating jobs, squelching innovation, and causing serious hardship.  
The goal of all levels of government should be to strike the right balance, with careful 
consideration of the track record of old rules and the likely consequences of new 
regulatory requirements (Greenstone, 2009).  
 
For over four decades, and under both Democratic and Republican presidents, the 
national government has attempted to achieve that goal and to discipline the regulatory 
process. It has done so by requiring detailed analysis of both the costs and benefits of 
regulations – and by allowing agencies to go forward, and to burden the private sector, 
only if the benefits justify the costs (Sunstein, 2013a).  
 
Our principal contention here is that state and local governments should do 
exactly the same thing. In today’s world, the need for regulatory discipline from state and 
local governments, and for careful cost-benefit analysis, is especially pressing. Such 
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governments are often responsible for requirements that many view as burdensome, 
unjustified, and harmful; permitting and occupational licensing requirements are 
prominent examples. Perhaps this view of local regulation is unduly negative, but sub-
national governments generally lack an institutional mechanism even to evaluate the 
negative claims. Cost-benefit analysis, undertaken by relevant personnel with real 
authority, would provide that mechanism.  Properly conducted and fairly applied, it 
would also operate as a safeguard against the power of interest groups, who often seek to 
enlist government on their behalf. Cost-benefit analysis is not intrinsically anti, or pro, 
regulation. Nor should it be seen as an effort to put policy judgments into an arithmetic 
straightjacket. It is simply a tool that helps produce good regulations and avoid bad ones.      
  
Indeed, we would go further. In 2011, the Obama Administration, with bipartisan 
support, called for an ambitious process through which federal agencies would 
periodically evaluate their existing rules, with the goal of eliminating or streamlining 
them when cost-benefit analysis suggested that elimination or streamlining was warranted 
(Sunstein, 2013a). The “regulatory lookback,” as it is called, has produced over 500 
reform proposals, and it is saving billions of dollars each year (ibid.). While the lookback 
remains a work-in-progress at the national level, there is every reason to think that states 
should be engaging in lookbacks of their own, eliminating and streamlining burdensome 
requirements.  
 
In some ways, states might be able to go far beyond the efforts of national 
government, because of their relative capacity and incentive to innovate. We envision a 
kind of competition at the state level, not to produce a mutually destructive “race to the 
bottom,” but to activate creative thinking about how to institutionalize regulatory 
simplification, freeing up the private sector while also improving, and certainly without 
jeopardizing, public safety, health, the environment, and quality of life.    
 
II. Regulatory Moneyball 
 
Relying on analysis of costs and benefits, instead of intuitions and anecdotes, 
might seem obvious, a little like relying on sense rather than nonsense. But the temptation 
to favor intuition over information is strong, and it leads to serious mistakes in private 
and public life. Recall Moneyball, Michael Lewis’ best-selling 2003 book (Lewis, 2003), 
which was the basis for the hit film of the same title, starring Brad Pitt. Lewis tells the 
story of Billy Beane, the general manager of the Oakland Athletics baseball team. With 
the help of his statistics-obsessed assistant, Paul DePodesta, Beane brought the once-
lowly Athletics into the top tier of baseball teams, and wound up transforming 
professional baseball, by substituting empirical data for long-standing dogmas, intuition, 
and anecdote-driven judgments. Lewis makes clear the difference between the two 
approaches in this exchange about a particular player between Beane, DePodesta, and a 
veteran baseball scout: 
 
“The guy’s an athlete, Billy,” the old scout says. “There’s a lot of upside there.” 
“He can’t hit,” says Billy. “He’s not that bad a hitter,” says the old scout....        Paul 
reads the player’s college batting statistics. They contain a conspicuous lack of extra 
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base hits and walks.  “My only question is,” says Billy, “if he’s that good a hitter why 
doesn’t he hit better?” 
 
In the past, too many regulators, state as well as federal, have been tempted to 
listen far too much when they were told that “the public is very worried,” or that “polls 
show that the majority of people strongly favor protection against air pollution,” or that 
“the industry has strong views,” or that “the environmental groups will go nuts,” or that 
“if an accident occurs, there will be hell to pay.” None of those observations addresses 
the real question, which is what policies and regulations would achieve. All over the 
United States, regulatory systems need their own Billy Beanes and Paul DePodestas, 
carefully assessing what rules will do before the fact and testing them after the fact 
(Sunstein, 2013a). 
 
There is a connection here with Daniel Kahneman’s celebrated distinction, 
drawing on many years of psychological research, between fast thinking and slow 
thinking (Kahneman, 2011). People can often make mistakes by thinking fast and relying 
on gut instinct. In some cases, intuitions and emotions drive judgments, potentially 
producing bad outcomes. The moneyball approach – represented by a quantitative cost-
benefit approach to regulation – imposes slow thinking. It represents a kind of 
institutionalization of a deliberative process, operating as a check on unreliable intuitions 
(whether they are favorable or unfavorable to proposed initiatives).  In the context of 
state and local regulation, this kind of check can be exceptionally important.      
 
Skeptics might object that debates about regulation are really about values, not 
facts. According to this view, when people disagree about a rule that would protect clean 
air or increase highway safety, it is because of what they most value, not because of 
disagreements about the evidence. We agree that on some of the largest issues, values and 
predispositions do play a critical role (Kahan, 2010). Cost-benefit analysis will do little to 
settle the debates surrounding the regulation of first-term abortions.    
 
At the same time, it is easy to overstate the point. For example, most people’s 
values do not lead to a clear judgment about whether to require small businesses to obtain 
permits to engage in certain activity, or what kinds of licensing requirements should be 
imposed on hairdressers or interior designers, or what kinds of obstacles should be placed 
in the way of those who seek to compete with traditional taxi companies. Values alone 
cannot guide the decision about whether to reduce levels of ozone in the ambient air from 
75 parts per billion to 70 parts per billion or, for that matter, to 20 parts per billion. To 
evaluate such proposals, factual evidence is indispensable. Even where value divisions 
are great, numbers can help. There are cheap and expensive rules that promote public 
safety, and we all should prefer the less costly options.    
 
When the evidence is clear, it will often lead people with different values to the 
same conclusion. If a regulation would save many lives and cost very little, people are 
likely to support it regardless of their party identification, and if a regulation would 
produce little benefit but impose heavy costs, citizens are unlikely to favor it regardless 
of their abstract ideas about government. No less than the national government, state and 
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local governments should be moving in the direction of Regulatory Moneyball, making 
choices about rules on the basis of careful analysis rather than intuitions, anecdotes, 
dogmas, and impressions. 
 
 
 
III. History 
 
To understand our proposal, some history is in order. At the national level, the 
modern era of regulatory review began in 1981, when President Reagan issued, during 
his first weeks in office, Executive Order 12291. That historic order, effectively binding 
on the executive branch, imposed two sets of requirements. The first were procedural; the 
second were substantive. 
 
Reagan’s procedural requirement directed agencies to submit their regulations to 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for approval (DeMuth and Ginsburg, 
1986). Operating within OMB, and created by the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) gained a great deal of authority over the 
regulatory process. Subject to the ultimate power of the President himself, OIRA could 
effectively decline to authorize agencies to impose regulations on the public. Of course, it 
was understood that OIRA would not be acting unchecked or on its own. Its decisions 
would be reached in close concert with others in the executive branch, including technical 
specialists of various kinds – an important point to which we will return. 
 
Reagan’s substantive requirement directed agencies to produce careful analyses of 
the costs and benefits of regulations, and to proceed only if the benefits outweighed the 
costs (subject to legal mandates issued by Congress) (ibid.). Under this approach, an 
agency could not finalize a regulation protecting worker safety if the costs were $700 
million and the benefits $90 million (unless the law required it to do so). The importance 
of this constraint could not easily be overstated. It was designed above all to ensure that 
agencies do not think in terms of interest groups, dogmas, anecdotes, or intuitions -- and 
instead that they investigate the actual consequences of the actions that they propose to 
take. Cost-benefit analysis is best understood as an effort to give officials and the public 
in general a sense of the anticipated human consequences of alternative courses of action. 
 
As part of the requirement to balance costs and benefits, Reagan also directed 
agencies to “maximize net benefits.” This direction meant that even if a proposed 
approach – involving, say, environmental protection -- would have net benefits of $100 
million, agencies could not proceed if another approach (whether less or more stringent) 
had net benefits of $200 million (again, subject to mandates issued by Congress). Of 
course, the task of monetizing costs and benefits can be challenging – another important 
point to which we shall return. 
 
In imposing these requirements, Reagan was motivated by three distinct concerns. 
The first, of particular relevance to our thesis here, involved purely economic 
considerations. In his view, many regulations could have harmful effects (including 
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adverse effects on businesses large and small, consumers, and employment), and it was 
important to ensure that if the government was imposing significant costs, it was creating 
significant benefits as well. A clear goal was to scale back the production of new 
regulatory requirements – not at all by grinding them to a halt, but by ensuring that they 
had strong, evidence-based justifications. 
 
The second and very different motivation, also relevant to our thesis, involved 
political control. During the early days of the Reagan Administration, there was a 
widespread view that the sheer number of regulatory agencies created a serious problem, 
which involved presidential management of their actions and indeed of the administrative 
state in general. Even if their heads were presidential appointees, some of their 
regulations might not reflect the principles or priorities of the President. (In some cases, it 
might reflect the principles or priorities of their staffs.) OIRA review, undertaken with 
close reference to presidential principles and priorities, could supply a corrective. A 
central goal, then, was to ensure hierarchical control of the operations of regulatory 
agencies, with close reference to the beliefs and commitments of elected officials, and 
above all, one in particular: the President of the United States. 
 
The third concern involved interagency coordination (Sunstein, 2013b). No 
agency has a monopoly on knowledge or wisdom, and the decisions of any single agency 
could benefit from the expertise of others. In this light, the OIRA process was understood 
to have a coordinating function, ensuring that multiple actors, with their own areas of 
specialization, could bring their knowledge to bear. For example, the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) knows a great deal about the effects of regulatory requirements on 
small business, and OIRA could help to be a mechanism by which the views of the SBA 
would be taken seriously. 
 
Under President Reagan and his successor George H.W. Bush, OIRA review 
proved to be highly controversial, especially among people who had far more enthusiasm 
for regulatory requirements than Presidents Reagan and Bush did.  In their view, 
regulatory review operated as an unfortunate obstacle to desirable initiatives (McGarity, 
2013). It was therefore important, and indeed historic, that President Bill Clinton 
essentially approved the Reagan approach with Executive Order 12866, issued in 1993.  
 
With that Executive Order, President Clinton did inaugurate some important 
changes. For example, he reduced the number of rules subject to OIRA review, limiting it 
to those with a significant economic impact ($100 million annually) or raising serious 
questions of law or policy. He said that the benefits must “justify” rather than “outweigh” 
the costs, thus allowing room for consideration of nonquantifiable values (such as 
protection of privacy). He imposed a set of disclosure requirements on OIRA and made it 
clear that in the event of conflict, the Vice President (and ultimately the President) would 
make the final decision. But the larger message was that Clinton embraced, essentially 
wholeheartedly, the very concerns that had led Reagan to act twelve years previously. 
 
Subsequent presidents have agreed (Sunstein, 2013b). Indeed, President Obama 
has taken particularly ambitious steps to ensure careful balancing of costs and benefits, 
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not least by calling for quantification of both (wherever feasible) and by insisting on 
scientific integrity (and hence a clear separation between political judgments and 
judgments about economic values) (ibid.; see Appendix). As we have noted, President 
Obama went well beyond his predecessors in calling for retrospective as well as 
prospective analysis. The effort to reassess existing requirements, and to simplify or 
remove them, is now an established part of the structure of national regulation.  
 
IV. A Rare Consensus, With Challenges 
 
Notwithstanding their bipartisan endorsement, no one believes that these various 
requirements have produced the best of all possible worlds. Some people think that 
federal regulatory requirements are excessive, even wildly excessive, and that the OIRA 
process has not done nearly enough to constrain them. Other people believe that OIRA 
has been far too aggressive and that it has slowed down, or stopped, a range of 
regulations that would reduce illnesses, accidents, and deaths (Heinzerling, 2013). But it 
is widely agreed that the process of regulatory review, with its insistent focus on costs 
and benefits, has made the situation far better than it would otherwise be, though more 
empirical work needs to be done on that question (for one review, see Morgenstern, 
1987). 
 
The shared agreement stems from an appreciation of the procedural and 
substantive innovations that Reagan inaugurated (ibid.; Sunstein, 2013b) – innovations 
that, as we shall see, have clear implications for state regulators. If the Environmental 
Protection Agency is issuing a rule that affects the transportation sector, or that has an 
impact on farmers, it is important and even indispensable for the Department of 
Transportation, or the Department of Agriculture, to offer its views. Interagency 
coordination, aggregating diverse information, is indispensable, and the OIRA process 
helps to ensure that it occurs. This point suggests that in the OIRA process, OIRA itself is 
often a convener far more than the central actor. It will aggregate information and take 
steps to ensure that dispersed knowledge is brought to bear on regulatory choices. 
 
In recent years, the process of information aggregation has emphatically involved 
the public – an important consideration for state government as well. At the national 
level, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) generally requires a public comment 
period for regulations. (Most states have their own APAs.) It is not always the case, 
however, that agencies ensure a robust opportunity for public comment, or that they pay 
close attention to the comments that they receive. As it now operates, the OIRA process 
is very much focused both on receiving public comments and on ensuring that they 
receive careful attention. Because members of the public often have information that 
agencies lack, the result of the comment period is to reduce the risk of error, in a tribute 
to longstanding economic attention to the dispersed knowledge of the public. 
 
 The OIRA process also promotes managerial goals, including consistency with 
the views of national leaders, above all the President himself. (The parallel with state 
government should be clear, because governors, among others, often seek to oversee their 
own bureaucracy, sometimes with imperfect success.) If an agency wants to pursue a path 
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that conflicts with high-level priorities, the process will ensure that the conflict will come 
to the agency’s attention. Suppose, for example, that economic growth is a high priority, 
or homeland security, or implementation of the Affordable Care Act. It is not only 
legitimate but also extremely important to ensure that the President can manage the 
operations of his own team. 
 
In our view, however, the most important point involves economic considerations. 
Even in ordinary economic times, it is valuable and even necessary to ensure that when 
agencies impose significant costs, they do so for good reasons. In periods of economic 
difficulty, when stringent regulation can impose an especially serious toll on businesses, 
consumers, and workers, the case for ensuring that benefits justify costs is even stronger. 
For example, there is a detailed literature in the relationship between regulation and job 
loss (Coglianese et al., 2014), and while any particular assessment requires a great deal of 
technical work, there is no question that some regulations cost jobs. And whenever 
regulations impose high costs, they can increase prices as well, straining consumer 
budgets and reducing consumer purchases as well (a particularly serious problem for the 
poor). 
 
As we have noted, the calculation of costs and benefits can create serious 
challenges. But economists have developed technical methods to meet those challenges, 
and those methods have long been in use at the national level (Sunstein, 2014). For 
example, the assessment of costs, or at least the range of likely costs, is often feasible, at 
least if regulators work with those who are likely to be affected (while also giving their 
assessment a careful reality check). When regulations have purely economic benefits – 
as, for example, through energy efficiency requirements that reduce the costs of 
appliances – the benefits calculation is also straightforward. To this extent, calculation of 
benefits and costs poses empirical challenges that economists are trained to meet. 
 
To be sure, the underlying questions become harder when regulation would 
reduce risks to life and health. How can we know whether an environmental rule, or one 
involving traffic safety, would save 200 lives per year, or twenty, or two? And even if we 
know, how can we turn those figures into monetary equivalents? The first question 
presents potentially difficult questions of fact. The good news is that it is often possible to 
gain traction on such questions, at least by identifying ranges (Sunstein, 2014).  
 
The second question may be even more controversial. But unless we try to answer 
it, we will be in a bad position when we must decide whether and how to proceed. 
Indeed, any judgment about whether to proceed, and how, will depend on an implicit 
assignment of monetary values: If you are willing to issue a regulation costing $200 
million to save 200, but not to save two, you are making such an implicit assignment. 
And here too, there is good news. Technical methods, based on decades of research, are 
available to help monetize risks to life and health (Sunstein, 2014). And where such 
methods are not available, OIRA has developed strategies to help decide how to resolve 
seemingly intractable dilemmas (ibid.). 
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We have noted that no one thinks the current regulatory system is ideal at the 
national level, but that most informed observers agree that it is far better than it would be 
without the OIRA process. But OIRA itself is often asked the following question: What 
are you going to do about costly, burdensome, unjustified requirements at the state level? 
Because of the nature of our federal system, OIRA has no sufficient answer to that 
question. But it is an excellent one. The real impetus for state and local regulatory review 
must come from state and local governments. 
 
 
V. The State of State and Local Regulation 
 
 
 Boston’s Dudley Square is the city’s busiest bus stop, with 30,000 passengers 
passing through daily (CBRE/Grossman Retail Advisors, 2013). Eighty thousand people 
live within a mile of the stop. Yet the area is an entertainment vacuum, with almost no 
restaurants, clubs or coffee houses. The lack of local fun is not merely an inconvenience 
to local residents looking for enjoyment, but also represents a dearth of service sector 
jobs that are badly needed in the neighborhood.    
 
 When local leaders are asked about the missing cafes, they mention Boston’s 
difficult regulatory regime (Gaffin, 2013). The state legislature has capped the number of 
liquor licenses in Boston since the 1930s, and as a result, the price for a license can top 
$300,000 (The Boston Globe, 2013). Any “common victualer” will need a bevy of 
licenses, including Certificates of Occupancy, health, and safety licenses. If a bar wants a 
television set that exceeds 27 inches, it will need an entertainment license, and if it wants 
to go from two to three televisions, that will require an added trip to the licensing board. 
Occupational licensing is pervasive, and it covers a wide range of people, seeking to 
become hairdressers, interior designers, dental assistants, manicurists, and much more. 
 
 There are reasons behind all of these rules, which aim to limit public nuisances 
and health hazards, but together they can have serious adverse effects and even kill a 
neighborhood. Moreover, none of these rules have ever been subject to the kind of 
analysis performed daily as a result of the OIRA process. Many studies have found that 
entrepreneurship is the life’s blood of urban regeneration (Glaeser, Kerr, and Kerr, 2012), 
which means that new business regulations that stymie entrepreneurship can have 
particularly large costs.   
 
Although most academic and public attention has been devoted to federal 
regulation, there is no question that state and local controls have a large impact, and have 
done so for a long period. William Novak’s (1996) eye-opening history of 19th century 
regulation in the United States reminds us that even in the allegedly laissez-faire years of 
the Gilded Age, American states and cities imposed a wide array of rules on their 
citizens. Indeed the Federal government—in the form of the Supreme Court— often 
limited local attempts at regulating industry, as it did most famously (or infamously) in 
Lochner v. New York (1905). Federal regulations rose dramatically over the 20th century, 
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but those rules did not eliminate the tendency of localities to regulate businesses and 
households as well.   
 
Boston is not uniquely strict in its new business regulations. For example, any 
New York State grocery or restaurant that plans to sell 3,000 pounds of milk monthly 
must obtain a separate milk dealer license. Blue laws that restrict business activity on 
Sunday are of ancient provenance (the Emperor Constantine promulgated one in 321), 
and they remain in force in many parts of the country. Local ordinances banning cigarette 
smoking have become ubiquitous over the past decade.   
 
Local businesses are also regulated because of their potential to create congestion 
or other nuisances. For example, installing gas ovens in New York City requires a 
separate fire department inspection, using liquefied carbon dioxide or petroleum gases 
requires separate permits, and commercial vehicles face a separate city tax. When it 
comes to cooking, there are also, of course, state and local rules that directly affect 
household behavior. Backyard barbecues are regulated in many communities.    
 
In some states, transportation is highly regulated, including mandatory use of seat 
belts and car seats for children. State regulations of automobiles can have a national 
impact.  California’s car market is so large that its emission standards influence the 
national production decisions of car manufacturers. Some states, but not others, require 
costly annual inspections, even in newer cars that carry little risk. Our point is not to 
suggest that any or all of these regulations are wrong -- only that they should be seriously 
evaluated (and often are not). Moreover, the differences that exist across states suggest 
that either the stringent states or the more laissez-faire areas are making serious errors.    
 
 Local governments are often just as assiduous about regulating new housing as 
they are in regulating new businesses and automobiles. Evidence seems to suggest that 
restricting the quantity of new construction makes places less affordable and thus 
adversely affects prospective homeowners (Katz and Rosen, 1987; Glaeser, Gyourko, and 
Saks, 2005). Rules that limit construction can effectively zone out poorer residents from 
areas, thus creating segregation via regulation.   
 
Housing regulations are ancient and often motivated by obvious risks; Boston 
banned thatched roofs in 1630, the year of the city’s founding, in the wake of an urban 
fire. New York City’s Tenement Acts first focused on fire risk in 1867 and then moved to 
mandate better ventilation and light in the interest of reducing contagious disease. 
Structural safety continues to be one reason that states and localities restrict new 
construction with building codes, but over the years, new rationales emerged for limiting 
new development.    
 
Single-use, or Euclidean zoning, was also originally justified, in part, as a tool to 
keep noxious industrial activities away from residential dwellings. New York City’s 
landmark zoning code of 1916 mandated setbacks to ensure the flow of light, motivated 
in part by the massive shadow cast when the Equitable Building was completed in 1915.   
After the destruction of New York’s old Penn Station, a new era of landmarks 
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preservation emerged where individual structures or even entire neighborhoods are 
placed under heavy supervision to limit change.     
 
Perhaps the most potent form of current land use regulations is the restriction of 
minimum lot sizes, which can range from small slivers of land to 60 acres in places like 
Marin County. The motivation for these laws varies, ranging from reduction of 
congestion or local expenditures to preservation of a traditional rural character. But there 
is little doubt that mandating a minimum amount of acreage ensures less construction in 
high demand areas (Glaeser and Ward, 2007) and if the laws of supply and demand still 
operate, this reduced supply will also raise prices.    
 
The web of environmentally oriented local regulations illustrates the diverse 
geographies and government actors that can all play a role in crafting local regulations.   
Massachusetts’ rules protecting wetlands originate in state legislation, such as Title XIX, 
Chapter 131, Section 40. But the Commissioner of Environmental Protection has 
significant leeway in administering and interpreting the law. Moreover, many 
communities in eastern Massachusetts have gone beyond the state standard and enacted 
more stringent local definitions of wetlands (Glaeser and Ward, 2007).     
 
Yet it is far from obvious that all environmentally motivated rules are actually 
good for the environment, and that question should be asked with care. Glaeser and Kahn 
(2010) document that carbon emissions are far lower in coastal California than elsewhere 
in the U.S., because the climate is so mild. When California’s environmentalists enact 
laws that prevent local building, they are not stopping development at the national level.  
They are ensuring only that the development will happen elsewhere, very possibly in 
some place where commutes will be further and energy use in air conditioning or heating 
will be higher. Local environmental impact reviews are incomplete, because they 
evaluate only the impact on the local environment if the project proceeds locally, not the 
broader impact on the environment if the project is displaced to another area.    
 
Inadvertent environmental side effects are only one reason why critics of local 
land use regulation suggest that they may have gone too far. This claim proceeds with a 
view that suggests that localities are motivated by extremely parochial interests 
(“NIMBYism”), and consider only the interests of local property owners, not the interests 
of would-be buyers who are priced out because of restricted supply. Indeed, Glaeser and 
Ward (2007) produce evidence suggesting that localities are too restrictive, even relative 
to the goal of maximizing total land values, perhaps because of a strong bias towards the 
status quo. Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks (2005) attempt to estimate the adverse social 
effects of building up in Manhattan and find few benefits that can justify the regulatory 
limits placed on new construction.  
 
If the potential downside of regulating housing is that the housing is too 
expensive, one potential downside of regulating businesses is that wages will be too low.    
Regulating businesses that cater directly to new consumers, such as Walmart, may also 
end up causing local consumers to pay more for locally-purchased commodities, either in 
the form of higher prices or time spent getting to groceries. Euclidean zoning rules that 
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restrict the location of businesses represent one restraint on business formation, but 
localities have many business-related regulations that are less inherently spatial.   
 
Americans debated local rules for much of the 20th century. Many of the great 
legal battles of the late 19th and early 20th century followed the decision of states—only 
rarely lower jurisdictions—to regulate working conditions for reasons other than public 
safety. The first battles were over physical working conditions, such as Samuel Gompers’ 
fight against tenement house cigar making in New York City, which was banned by the 
New York State legislature in 1883, after heavy support from the young Theodore 
Roosevelt.   
 
Yet while there is extensive literature on the impact of land use regulations, the 
literature on the effects of business regulations is far less developed. Objectivity and rigor 
are of course essential here. There is no domestic equivalent to the World Bank’s Doing 
Business report, which measures the cost and number of permits required to open a firm 
in cities throughout the world (although the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Research 
Association is developing such a measure). Many of the studies of state-level regulation 
have examined the correlation between some aggregate measure of business-friendliness 
and economic growth, and while these results can be suggestive, it is hard to draw 
anything definitive from such course. More compelling evidence has come from the 
study of particular rules, such as branch-banking regulation (Jayaratne and Strahan, 
1996), where it does appear that some regulations are capable of restricting economic 
growth.  We have referred to occupational licensing requirements, which sometimes 
seem to be an effort to restrict entry, and to insulate existing providers, under a public 
interest veneer. 
 
One particularly notable form of geographic variation is that after the 1947 Taft-
Hartley Act, many states passed Right-To-Work laws, which prohibit firms from signing 
“Union Shop” agreements, which require them to fire workers who refuse to pay at least 
some portion of their union dues. Holmes (1997) compared neighboring counties and 
found that manufacturing increased substantially after 1947 on the pro-business side of 
state lines.        
  
We take no stand on whether these myriad state and local rules have benefits that 
exceed the costs. We do, however, emphasize that these rules have accreted over 
centuries, and were generally issued with no serious cost-benefit analysis whatsoever. In 
many cases, the effects of the rules may be so minor that serious review is not worth that 
effort, but in other cases, it is surely appropriate to weigh measurable costs against 
benefits, both for new legislation and for existing rules. We now sketch a plausible 
structure for such a process.        
 
 
VI. What States and Local Governments Might Do 
 
 We believe that states could well benefit from some version of an Office of 
Regulatory Affairs, charged with the goals of ensuring that regulations survive some kind 
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of cost-benefit test, of promoting interagency coordination, and of increasing 
accountability. But there are several important issues of scope and design. (See 
Appendix, with Executive Order 13563, for relevant principles; that Executive Order is 
best read in conjunction with Executive Order 12866, which sets out the relevant 
institutional requirements in detail.) 
   
A. State or Local? 
 
Few localities in the country have the depth of personnel needed to create an 
Office of Regulatory Affairs. New York City surely can, and perhaps Chicago and Los 
Angeles, but such an administrative task becomes infeasible once we move to smaller 
areas. Moreover, the similarity between smaller localities means that highly localized 
offices would be duplicating tasks, rather than building up a common bank of expertise. 
There is also a risk that localized offices would tend to focus on very local costs and 
benefits, and ignore benefits that occur beyond the area’s borders. Finally, since all 
localities face an overlapping of state and local regulations, it might be difficult for a 
purely local office to have the perspective to consider how such regulations fit together.   
  
For these reasons, we believe that the natural home for any office of regulatory 
evaluation is the state, not the locality. States have greater resources and a wider 
perspective. Moreover, since city governments all fundamentally operate under state law, 
there would typically be no legal problem with requiring local regulations to follow the 
guidance of a state-wide officer, as there would be if the Federal government attempted 
to make state level regulations subservient to Washington’s cost-benefit analysis. For 
example, much of the local zoning in the U.S. was made possible only because states 
passed standard enabling legislation, such as Massachusetts Chapter 40A. It is clearly 
within the state’s power to require changes in local codes to adhere to state-mandated 
norms of cost-benefit analysis. To be sure, some legal changes might well be necessary 
for this structure to be put in place. 
  
In many cases, the state itself may be too small rather than too large an entity to 
evaluate new regulations. Regulations in New York City affect northern New Jersey and 
vice-versa. Regulations in Philadelphia affect Camden. Restricting housing supply in 
coastal California may affect the entire nation. Yet, even though states are surely 
imperfect implementers of such analysis, they are the institutions at hand, and state-level 
analysis seems better than any other option.    
   
B. Regulation, Legislation, or Both? 
 
OIRA’s powers are limited to reviewing executive branch regulations; it does not 
analyze or constrain legislative enactments. We believe that it would be deeply 
regrettable if any state evaluation office limited itself to regulations. We envision a 
structure in which the relevant office would have OIRA-like authority over regulations, 
but an advisory and consultative role in connection with legislative proposals. 
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At the national level, OIRA’s limited role allows it to do a great deal, for the 
federal government has a large number of agencies, such as the Department of 
Transportation, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of 
Agriculture, and the Environmental Protection Agency, all of which have been given 
broad regulatory powers. To be sure, there do exist many local or state counterparts. We 
have already discussed the definitional control over wetlands ceded to the Massachusetts 
Environmental Protection Commissioner, and at the local level, zoning administration is 
often ceded to agencies such as the New York City Department of City Planning or the 
Boston Redevelopment Agency. Still, much of state and local regulation comes directly 
from state law or local ordinance. Limiting oversight to the executive branch would leave 
most local regulations untouched.   
  
We believe that it would be most effective to have a single entity, charged by state 
law to make assessments of executive branch regulations, state laws, and local legislative 
actions. It is easy to imagine state legislation that essentially forbid executive and local 
regulations that failed to be approved by this agency. All the same, the legislature is 
unlikely to bind itself in that way, and it would have legitimate reasons for declining to 
do. A feasible structure would be one in which the agency could offer a nonbinding 
analysis of proposed legislation. Even if it would not be binding, the analysis would 
undoubtedly play a significant role in legislative deliberations. The European Union now 
follows a model of this sort. 
  
If the office is evaluating legislative proposals, as we suggest, then not only OIRA 
but also the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) becomes a model for its operations.   
Over the last forty years, the CBO has maintained a reputation for impartial integrity and 
sound analysis through Democratic and Republican administrations and leadership.    
Several features of the CBO structure are worth highlighting. Both branches of the 
legislature need to approve the CBO director, and they have the power to dismiss him or 
her. The position is at least nominally made without attention to political party.   These 
would all be desirable features in a local agency as well.   
  
The CBO, however, does differ from OIRA along a major dimension directly 
relevant to our proposal. Its goal is to evaluate the budgetary impact of different forms of 
legislation, not overall costs and benefits, and its evaluations are constrained by very 
rigid rules. For example, the budget projections often assume no further changes in tax 
laws, even when those changes are highly likely. Cost-benefit analysis, as opposed to 
projecting budgets, is typically more difficult and more holistic. We suspect that CBO 
personnel may indeed be quite helpful in providing support and assistance for nascent 
state-level evaluation groups, but it needs to be recognized that the task is somewhat 
different.  
 
C. Minimalism and Maximalism 
 
State governments are highly diverse in terms of their capacities and their needs, 
and a one-size-fits-all model does not make sense. But for state and local governments, a 
great deal would be gained by adapting some version of the original Reagan model, with 
 14 
 
its two simple components: an oversight process and a substantive requirement of cost-
benefit balancing. For both components, minimalist and maximalist versions can easily 
be imagined.  
 
 A minimalist version would involve the creation of some kind of technical 
capacity, reposed perhaps in a small group or office, whose task would be to scrutinize 
the most significant, burdensome, or controversial rules and to give them some kind of 
reality check. A commitment to an assessment of costs and benefits, to be produced by 
officials in that office or in the office or agency that seeks to impose the rules, could 
ensure that the reality check is real. Under the minimalist approach, the small office, 
combined with that commitment, could help to deter unjustified requirements and to 
ensure that officials are focused on what really matters, which is the human consequences 
of their actions. 
 
 A maximalist version would involve something closer to what the national 
government does now. States and cities could create their own Offices of Regulatory 
Affairs, consisting of people with a degree of economics training, enabling them to 
produce, or at least to scrutinize, careful analysis of costs and benefits. For certain rules – 
perhaps those anticipated to cost more than $25 million annually – relevant officials 
might be required to produce a full-scale regulatory impact analysis, akin to what now 
emerges from the Federal government. The length and depth of the analysis would be a 
function of the cost and importance of the particular regulation. 
 
 We much prefer the maximalist model, because it is most likely to prevent 
harmful outcomes, but we recognize that some states will lack both the will and the 
capacity, and a degree of experimentation is highly desirable. Some states might do well 
to “pilot” the minimalist model and to build on it if it works well. 
 
D. The Nature of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
1. Basic issues. What would cost-benefit analysis look like at the state and local 
level? For many questions, the approach would be essentially identical to that used at the 
federal level, and should be based on the same tools and techniques. OMB Circular A-4 
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4), supplemented by various 
guidance documents (including a primer, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/circular-a-
4_regulatory-impact-analysis-a-primer.pdf, and a simple checklist, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/RIA_Checklist.pdf), 
outlines those tools and techniques. Air pollution controls, for example, might borrow 
directly on what is now done by the EPA, and highway safety regulation could draw on 
the longstanding work of the Department of Transportation. But some domains present 
special challenges. 
 
The well-defined area of land use regulation is an example.  Consider a decision 
to raise the minimum lot size in a community for new construction from one to two acres.    
The potential beneficiaries from this rule would be the community members who gain 
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from lower levels of congestion, possibly a nice view when walking or driving, and 
possibly less financial burden on their local public services. These local benefits could be 
estimated directly or indirectly inferred through land values. A long intellectual tradition 
argues that local amenities and tax obligations are captured in land values, so an 
assessment of the link between new construction and property values provides one means 
of assessing the upside of the regulations.   
 
 On the downside, the new regulation will take from owners who would like to 
subdivide their property, potentially reduce tax revenues, and potentially add to 
congestion if restricting development close to the city center pushes building further 
away. There are also potentially local environmental benefits of lower density that need 
to be offset against the environmental losses of pushing buildings further away. These 
calculations are not simple, but they are doable, and once an agency has developed a 
template for these calculations, they can easily be repeated in multiple jurisdictions.    
  
 A state-wide cost-benefit agency will not have the resources to examine every 
single form of legislation. We have suggested that as at the national level (with the 
threshold of $100 million in economic impact), it makes sense to have a minimum 
threshold needed for evaluation, based on a preliminary investigation of the regulation. 
However, unlike at the national level, the threshold should also be based on repetition. 
One community’s change in zoning laws might not meet a minimum lower threshold on 
costs, but when repeated hundreds of times by different areas, the threshold would 
certainly be hit. For this reason, it makes more sense to have a minimum threshold based 
on the total number of cases for which the developed methodology is useful.    
 
 2. Challenges for quantification. It also makes sense to recognize risk and 
uncertainty. States can reflect their preferences around these issues in different ways. A 
state that was particularly fearful of regulatory overreach might set the bar at parity 
between costs and benefits, or even require benefits to exceed costs by some minimal 
amount. Alternatively, a state that wished to err on the side of certain safeguards for 
safety, health, and the environment might allow regulations to proceed as long as 
estimated costs were no more than 10 percent higher than benefits.  
 
 These statements all concern the average or expected levels of costs and benefits, 
and in many cases, there will be some possibility that costs or benefits will differ widely 
from the main projection. We suspect that the complexity of risk-adjusted scoring rules 
could just be too great, but it is certainly possible to have rules that give more weight to 
particularly bad outcomes than to particularly good outcomes. OMB Circular A-4 offers 
some guidance on this question. 
 
 How should the agency deal with hard-to-quantify costs and benefits, such as 
protection of privacy, building access for those who use wheelchairs, or the religious 
benefits allegedly associated with blue laws? The national government has a great deal of 
experience with this question. The standard approach involves “breakeven analysis” 
(Sunstein, 2014), by which agencies ask: How high would the non-quantified benefits 
have to be to justify the costs? 
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Suppose, for example, that the EPA is considering a water pollution rule that 
would cost $1 billion and deliver $200 million in quantifiable benefits (say, in terms of 
human health and improved recreation), but that would also produce significant 
nonquantifiable benefits (in terms of, say, ecological benefits). Relevant questions would 
be: How many water bodies? What kinds of improvements? What would those 
improvements actually achieve? Would they help human beings and, if so, how? Suppose 
that the number of water bodies is not large, that the improvements are relatively modest, 
and that for human beings, those benefits do not do a great deal of good. If so, an 
expenditure of $1 billion would not be easy to defend, assuming that the quantifiable 
benefits are in the range of $200 million. Unless the law required the agency to proceed, 
the rule would encounter serious questions. 
 
Suppose, by contrast, that once we investigate the details, we find that the rule 
would make a large difference – for example, because it would protect a numerous water 
bodies, and do a great deal for them, with a wide range of aesthetic and ecological 
benefits (including the protection of fish and wildlife). If, we may have enough to justify 
a serious discussion. A similar analysis could be applied to a wide range of regulations 
with benefits that are difficult or impossible to quantify. Consider, for example, laws 
protecting disabled people against discrimination or safeguarding personal privacy 
(Sunstein, 2014). 
 
 In some cases, the problem of apparent nonquantifiability becomes more tractable 
if the state has alternative means of achieving the same ends. For example, a specific goal 
for the protection of wildlife might be achievable either by restricting development in the 
denser and more economically active section of a state or by increasing the size of a state 
park in a less dense area. Other things being equal, the less expensive means should be 
chosen.  
 
To be sure, some problems present exceedingly difficult challenges, for which 
economic analysis cannot have the final word. But the federal experience suggests that 
these challenges should not be overstated – and that quantitative analysis can operate as 
an indispensable check on decisions that might otherwise be based on intuitions, 
anecdotes, or interest-group pressures. 
 
Conclusion 
 
No one should deny that regulation can do a great deal of good, not least by 
lengthening lives. But if it is poorly designed, it can jeopardize a wide range of social 
goals, reducing economic growth, harming small businesses, and squelching innovation. 
For all its limitations, cost-benefit analysis is the most disciplined way to test whether 
regulatory requirements are a good idea. At the national level, its track record establishes 
its ability to separate the wheat from the chaff – to make the case for sensible mandates 
(even in the face of political opposition) and to decrease the likelihood that regulatory 
initiatives will be ill-directed. 
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It is remarkable but true that nearly thirty-five years after President Reagan 
established what has proved to be an enduring national commitment to such analysis, 
state and local governments have shown, at most, sporadic efforts in its directions. This is 
ironic, because such governments are best positioned to experiment with new institutional 
forms – and to develop models from which other states, and the federal government itself, 
can learn. In a period of economic difficulty, to which ill-conceived regulations 
sometimes contribute, there is new urgency for institutional reform at the state-level, in 
the form of an endorsement of Regulatory Moneyball. 
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Appendix  
 
Executive Order 13563 of January 18, 2011: Improving Regulation and Regulatory 
Review 
 
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the 
United States of America, and in order to improve regulation and regulatory review, it is 
hereby ordered as follows:  
 
Section 1. General Principles of Regulation. (a) Our regulatory system must 
protect public health, welfare, safety, and our environment while promoting economic 
growth, innovation, competitiveness, and job creation. It must be based on the best 
available science. It must allow for public participation and an open exchange of ideas. It 
must promote predictability and reduce uncertainty. It must identify and use the best, 
most innovative, and least burdensome tools for achieving regulatory ends. It must take 
into account benefits and costs, both quantitative and qualitative. It must ensure that 
regulations are accessible, consistent, written in plain language, and easy to understand. It 
must measure, and seek to improve, the actual results of regulatory requirements.  
 
(b) This order is supplemental to and reaffirms the principles, structures, and 
definitions governing contemporary regulatory review that were established in Executive 
Order 12866 of September 30, 1993. As stated in that Executive Order and to the extent 
permitted by law, each agency must, among other things: (1) propose or adopt a 
regulation only upon a reasoned determination that its benefits justify its costs 
(recognizing that some benefits and costs are difficult to quantify); (2) tailor its 
regulations to impose the least burden on society, consistent with obtaining regulatory 
objectives, taking into account, among other things, and to the extent practicable, the 
costs of cumulative regulations; (3) select, in choosing among alternative regulatory 
approaches, those approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential economic, 
environmental, public health and safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; and 
equity); (4) to the extent feasible, specify performance objectives, rather than specifying 
the behavior or manner of compliance that regulated entities must adopt; and (5) identify 
and assess available alternatives to direct regulation, including providing economic 
incentives to encourage the desired behavior, such as user fees or marketable permits, or 
providing information upon which choices can be made by the public.  
 
(c) In applying these principles, each agency is directed to use the best available 
techniques to quantify anticipated present and future benefits and costs as accurately as 
possible. Where appropriate and permitted by law, each agency may consider (and 
discuss qualitatively) values that are difficult or impossible to quantify, including equity, 
human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts.  
 
Sec. 2. Public Participation. (a) Regulations shall be adopted through a process 
that involves public participation. To that end, regulations shall be based, to the extent 
feasible and consistent with law, on the open exchange of information and perspectives 
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among State, local, and tribal officials, experts in relevant disciplines, affected 
stakeholders in the private sector, and the public as a whole.  
 
(b) To promote that open exchange, each agency, consistent with Executive Order 
12866 and other applicable legal requirements, shall endeavor to provide the public with 
an opportunity to participate in the regulatory process. To the extent feasible and 
permitted by law, each agency shall afford the public a meaningful opportunity to 
comment through the Internet on any proposed regulation, with a comment period that 
should generally be at least 60 days. To the extent feasible and permitted by law, each 
agency shall also provide, for both proposed and final rules, timely online access to the 
rulemaking docket on regulations.gov, including relevant scientific and technical 
findings, in an open format that can be easily searched and downloaded. For proposed 
rules, such access shall include, to the extent feasible and permitted by law, an 
opportunity for public comment on all pertinent parts of the rulemaking docket, including 
relevant scientific and technical findings.  
 
(c) Before issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking, each agency, where feasible 
and appropriate, shall seek the views of those who are likely to be affected, including 
those who are likely to benefit from and those who are potentially subject to such 
rulemaking.  
 
Sec. 3. Integration and Innovation. Some sectors and industries face a significant 
number of regulatory requirements, some of which may be redundant, inconsistent, or 
overlapping. Greater coordination across agencies could reduce these requirements, thus 
reducing costs and simplifying and harmonizing rules. In developing regulatory actions 
and identifying appropriate approaches, each agency shall attempt to promote such 
coordination, simplification, and harmonization. Each agency shall also seek to identify, 
as appropriate, means to achieve regulatory goals that are designed to promote 
innovation.  
 
Sec. 4. Flexible Approaches. Where relevant, feasible, and consistent with 
regulatory objectives, and to the extent permitted by law, each agency shall identify and 
consider regulatory approaches that reduce burdens and maintain flexibility and freedom 
of choice for the public. These approaches include warnings, appropriate default rules, 
and disclosure requirements as well as provision of information to the public in a form 
that is clear and intelligible.  
 
Sec. 5. Science. Consistent with the President’s Memorandum for the Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies, ‘‘Scientific Integrity’’ (March 9, 2009), and its 
implementing guidance, each agency shall ensure the objectivity of any scientific and 
technological information and processes used to support the agency’s regulatory actions.  
 
Sec. 6. Retrospective Analyses of Existing Rules. (a) To facilitate the periodic 
review of existing significant regulations, agencies shall consider how best to promote 
retrospective analysis of rules that may be outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or 
excessively burdensome, and to modify, streamline, expand, or repeal them in accordance 
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with what has been learned. Such retrospective analyses, including supporting data, 
should be released online whenever possible.  
 
(b) Within 120 days of the date of this order, each agency shall develop and 
submit to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs a preliminary plan, consistent 
with law and its resources and regulatory priorities, under which the agency will 
periodically review its existing significant regulations to determine whether any such 
regulations should be modified, streamlined, expanded, or repealed so as to make the 
agency’s regulatory program more effective or less burdensome in achieving the 
regulatory objectives.  
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